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Heileman Brewing Co. Inc. v. Joseph Oat Corporation:
Defining the Perimeters of Judicial Involvement in the
Settlement Process
Should you be called upon to function as a judge, do not be like the legal
advisers who offer to place their juridical knowledge at the service of the
litigating parties .... [Y]ou must remain silent and abstain from interfer-
ence in the arguments .... Do not by so much as a gesture seek to influ-
ence either prosecution or defense.
- Commentary on the Mishnah (Pirke Avot)1
[Tihe judge should actively and firmly (but not coercively) seek to settle
every case on his docket .... I suggest that no more than five per cent of
each year's civil terminations should result from fully tried cases. The other
ninety-five percent, if not settled by counsel themselves, should be settled
with the judge's active intervention.
- Judge Frederick Lacey2
1. INTRODUCTION
A blindfolded female figure, draped in robes and carrying scales and a
sword, adorns the courtrooms of the United States. Her familiar shape
has long endured as this nation's symbol of justice, signifying fairness
and impartiality to all. Unapproachable and incorruptible, she illustrates
the physical and psychological distance between judge and litigants. Her
scales represent the obligation to balance claims fairly and evenhand-
edly, while her sword reflects the power to enforce decisions without
sympathy or compromise. Most importantly, her blindfold represents
protection from distraction and from information which could bias or
corrupt.3 In accord with the principles behind this judicial symbol, the
United States' judicial system developed as an adversary system, bestow-
ing upon litigants the power to control case preparation while restricting
the judiciary to a neutral and relatively passive role.
The central precept of adversary process is that out of the sharp clash of
proofs presented by adversaries in a highly structured forensic setting is
most likely to come the information from which a neutral and passive deci-
I. Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376 (1982)(quoting Hirsch com-
mentary to CHAPTER OF THE FATHERS (PIRKE AvOT) 12 (S.R. Hirsch trans. & comm., G.
Hirschler trans. 1967) (emphasis omitted).
2. Galanter, " . . A Settlement Judge, not a Trial Judge:" Judicial Mediation in the
United States, 12 J.L. & Soc'y 1, 4 (1985).
3. Resnik, supra note i, at 383.
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sion maker can resolve a litigated dispute in a manner that is acceptable
both to the parties and to society."
Pursuant to adversary theory, a neutral and passive fact finder resolves
disputes based upon evidence furnished by contending parties during the
course of trial. Each actor in this traditional system plays a particular
role, fulfilling a separate and distinct function. The parties to the action
control case preparation and presentation. Each party's lawyer gathers
all potentially necessary information during out-of-court pretrial discov-
ery, carefully preparing the legal and factual issues which may arise at
trial. If the parties do not settle, the lawyers select and present proofs at
trial.' The judge, who may also act as fact finder, presides at the trial,
directing its progression and weighing evidence and legal arguments. The
fact finder (either judge or jury) listens passively to the evidence and
testimony submitted by the parties, refraining from arriving at a judg-
ment until the conclusion of the trial. To ensure the system's proper
functioning, the fact finder and judge (if not one and the same) must
abstain from participating either in the collection of evidence or in the
parties' settlement of the case. According to adversary theory, any fact
finder or judge straying from this passive role risks prematurely commit-
ting himself to one version of the facts, thereby losing the impartiality
essential to the system's operation.6 Each actor executes his role pursu-
ant to an elaborate set of rules governing pretrial and posttrial periods
(rules of procedure), the trial itself (rules of evidence), and the behavior
of counsel (rules of ethics). These rules seek to preserve the fact finder's
neutrality and passivity, enhance the attorneys' power to control the fact
presentation process, and confine the judge's authority to manage the
proceedings.7
In contrast to our lawyer-dominated judicial system, the Continental
system of justice, as exemplified by West German civil procedure, places
fundamental emphasis on active inquiry by the judge to uncover the
truth.' While the lawyer still plays an important role in the Continental
system by overseeing the work of the court, formulating the clients' posi-
tion through legal argument, and nominating lines of factual inquiry, the
court determines the sequence of factual investigation and examines the
witnesses unfettered by any elaborate set of rules of evidence.' Moreover,
the Continental system does not distinguish between the pretrial and
4. Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adversary System, 44 OHIo
ST. L.J. 713, 714 (1983).
5. Id. at 715.
6. Id. at 714-15.
7. Id. at 716.
8. Id. at 724.
9. Langbein, Trashing the German Advantage, 82 Nw. U.L. REv. 763, 763 (1988).
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trial stages of litigation. The Continental court investigates and adjudi-
cates in a series of discontinuous hearings, holding as many as necessary
to settle or decide the case. As the case progresses through these hear-
ings, the judge actively discusses the proceedings with the litigants,
sometimes indicating provisional views of the likely outcome and, thus,
encouraging settlement. 0
Disgruntled with long court delays, expanding volumes of litigation,
and skyrocketing attorney and litigation expenses, increasing numbers of
scholars, judges, and even lawyers advocate abandonment of our tradi-
tional adversary system in favor of alternative methods of dispute resolu-
tion which incorporate many of the Continental system's characteris-
tics." The various methods of alternative dispute resolution have
achieved different degrees of acceptance and success, repeatedly receding
from and emerging into the forefront of controversy. Much of today's
controversy revolves around the technique of "managerial judging.""
As scholars focus less on the need to foster judicial decisions on the
merits and more on the desirability of limiting the use of the courts, the
roles adhered to in our traditional system blur together. The physical and
psychological distance between judge and litigants narrows as judges dis-
card their disinterested poses and pursue more active stances. Today's
judges not only act as referees, but also meet with the parties in cham-
bers to encourage settlement and to supervise case preparation.
"[Jiudges remove their blindfolds and become part of the saga them-
selves."' 3 The judge of today plays a critical role in shaping litigation
and influencing results. Proponents of alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) contend that managerial judging and other movements away
from the adversary system, such as neutral expert witnesses, discovery
scheduling, and court-initiated limits on discovery, decrease the costs of
litigation, minimize the delay associated with our traditional system, and
reduce the amount of litigation initiated, achieving the "just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action."' 4 Yet, while some persons
applaud the ad hoc efforts of judges to quicken resolution of cases and to
persuade litigants to settle, others question the legitimacy of judicial
10. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REy. 823, 826-
32 (1985).
II. Id. at 858-66.
12. See generally Resnik, supra note 1. The term "managerial judging," as coined by
Judith Resnik, refers to the active participation of the judiciary in litigation, including
closer judicial supervision of discovery and other pretrial activities and judicial involvement
in the settlement process.
13. Resnik, supra note 1, at 408.
14. See Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a
Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770, 771 (1981) (quoting FED. R. Civ.
P. 1).
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dominance and involvement in both case preparation and the tradition-
ally private settlement process.1"
II. HISTORY OF JUDICIAL PARTICIPATION IN THE SETTLEMENT
PROCESS
The two quotations introducing this Note reflect the evolution of the
judge from "reticent dispenser of justice merely presiding over trial pro-
ceedings" to "active case manager involved in the formulation and direc-
tion of civil litigation."' 6 The beginning of this evolutionary process dates
back to 1929 when the Circuit Court of Wayne County, Michigan, find-
ing its docket backlogged forty-five months, instituted a system of com-
pulsory pretrial conferences between the lawyers and a judge to promote
settlement. This system of mandatory conferences reduced the wait for a
trial in Wayne County, Michigan to between twelve and fifteen
months."7 Spurred by the promising results of the Michigan "experi-
ment," courts in a number of cities adopted the system with favorable
results.' 8 The growing popularity and use of this pretrial system
culminated in the adoption of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, creating federal pretrial procedure.'
The drafters of Rule 16 did not intend to drastically change the
judge's role in litigation. The Federal Rules envisioned a lawyer-con-
trolled pretrial process subject to neutral judicial oversight.20 In fact, the
drafters of Rule 16 intentionally omitted settlement from the goals of
pretrial proceedings. They did not feel that settlement negotiations
should occur during pretrial conference."
Despite the drafters' intentions, discussions of settlement frequently
entered the pretrial conference under the auspices of Rule 16(c)(l 1).
This subpart of Rule 16 allows judges to consider during pretrial confer-
ence those "matters as may aid in the disposition of an action."'2 2 Such
judicial intervention received increasing support, resulting in the amend-
15. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 1; Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
Fiss argues that ADR possesses the same flaws as plea bargaining in the criminal case:
coercion, imbalance of power, and miscarriages of justice.
16. Rayner, Judicial Authority in the Settlement of Federal Civil Cases, 42 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 171, 171 (1985).
17. Oesterle, Trial Judges in Settlement Discussions: Mediators or Hagglers?, 9 COR-
NELL L.F. 7, 7 (1982).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Galanter, supra note 2, at 7.
21. Oesterle, supra note 17, 7 (citing Clark, Objectives of Pre-trial Procedures, 17 OHIO
ST. L.J. 163, 167 (1956)).
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(I1).
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ment of Rule 16 in 1983 to expressly include the facilitation of settle-
ment as a purpose of the pretrial conference. 3 The advisory committee
noted that the amendment gave formal recognition to a commonplace
practice.2 ' Recent studies lend credence to the committee's observations,
illustrating the extent to which such intervention occurs. In a nation-
wide survey of trial judges only 21.8 percent of 2,545 responding judges
described their philosophy as noninterventionist. 5
III. HEILMAN BREWING CO. V. JOSEPH OAT CORP.
The technique of managerial judging, specifically judicial involvement
in the settlement process, gives rise to many legal battles. Heileman
Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corporation6 represents one such conflict,
questioning the scope of the judge's power to order settlement confer-
ences. The origins of the suit trace back to 1980 when Joseph Oat Cor-
poration supplied a pretreatment system for a waste water treatment
plant built by RME Associates for G. Heileman Brewing Company. The
system allegedly failed to work as expected, resulting in a number of
disputes between Joseph Oat, RME, and Heileman. N.V. Centrale
Suicker Maatschappi (Centrale), the Dutch corporation responsible for
developing the pretreatment system and naming Joseph Oat as its exclu-
sive licensee in the United States, was also a party to the dispute. Joseph
Oat sued both Heileman and RME in federal district court.2" RME
counterclaimed and joined Centrale as a third-party defendant. Al-
though Joseph Oat settled its difference with Heileman and dismissed its
claims against RME, RME's claims against Joseph Oat and Centrale
remained. The district court set RME's claims for trial in January,
1985.8 RME, Centrale, and Heileman pursued settlement discussions.
Joseph Oat, however, refused to take part in the proceedings, disclaiming
any desire to settle. The magistrate, whom the district court designated
to hear pretrial matters, subsequently postponed the trial and ordered
the parties to attend a settlement conference conducted in his presence.
The court order required each party to send to such conference not only
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c).
24. Galanter, supra note 2, at 7 (quoting advisory committee's note to Rule 16).
25. Id.
26. 107 F.R.D. 275 (W.D. Wis. 1985), rev'd, 848 F.2d 1415 (7th Cir. 1988), arfd en
bane, 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989).
27. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 849 r.2d 1415, 1417 (7th Cir. 1988),
rev'd en bane, 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989).
28. Id.
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its counsel, but also a representative possessing full settlement
authority.9
Despite the court order, Joseph Oat sent only its counsel to the settle-
ment proceeding, declining to send a party representative with full settle-
ment authority. Joseph Oat's counsel informed the presiding magistrate
that he lacked requisite authority to agree to a settlement offer. The
magistrate excluded Joseph Oat's counsel from the conference because
he lacked such settlement authority. Following that day's discussions, the
magistrate continued the conference in the presence of all parties in-
volved in the litigation, including Joseph Oat's counsel. The magistrate
again ordered each party, including Joseph Oat's and RME's liability
insurers, to send a representative possessing full settlement authority to
the conference.30
Joseph Oat's counsel and its outside corporate counsel discussed the
order in ensuing phone conversations, apparently interpreting it to re-
quire that someone other than trial counsel attend the settlement confer-
ences. In the meantime, Joseph Oat's liability insurer, National Union,
informed Joseph Oat of its refusal both to pay any money for settlement
and to send a representative to the settlement conference. Joseph Oat's
outside corporate counsel, therefore, deemed any settlement payment by
Joseph Oat an impossibility. Outside counsel requested that trial counsel
contact the magistrate and inquire if, in light of the circumstances, Jo-
seph Oat still needed to send someone from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
to Madison, Wisconsin to attend the conference. Despite knowledge of
Joseph Oat's predicament, the magistrate reiterated his earlier order, re-
fusing to bend even in light of the exigent circumstances. 3'
In view of the magistrate's reply, outside corporate counsel accompa-
nied Joseph Oat's trial counsel to the settlement conferences in Madison
so as to comply with the magistrate's order. Like trial counsel, however,
Joseph Oat's outside corporate counsel lacked the authority to offer or to
agree to any settlement payment on the behalf of Joseph Oat. In fact,
Joseph Oat instructed its trial counsel to inform the court that the corpo-
ration would not pay any money to settle the dispute.32
The magistrate deemed Joseph Oat's failure to send a representative
other than trial or outside corporate counsel, both of whom lacked the
mandated full settlement authority, a violation of his order. He required
Joseph Oat to show cause why the corporation should not be subject to
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1417-18.
32. Id. at 1418.
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sanction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f).33 After a hearing
on the order to show cause, the magistrate sanctioned Joseph Oat and its
insurer, ordering them to pay RME, RME's liability insurer, Centrale,
and Heileman the costs, including attorneys' fees, incurred in attending
the conference.34
Joseph Oat subsequently petitioned the district court, asking for recon-
sideration. of the magistrate's order. The district judge affirmed the mag-
istrate's decision, holding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 au-
thorized a district court to order parties to send a representative with full
settlement authority to settlement conferences. The judge further de-
clared that Joseph Oat waived any objection to the magistrate's order by
ignoring the order instead of attempting to have the district court vacate
or modify it prior to the date scheduled for the conference.36
Thereafter, Joseph Oat appealed the district court's order affirming
the sanctions leveled by the magistrate. The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit ruled that the magistrate's order fell outside the bounds
of judicial authority under Rule 16. In overturning the magistrate's or-
der, the court considered the applicable federal rules, relevant case law,
and policy considerations. The court concluded that sanctioning a party
for "bad faith" simply because the party's attorney proclaims at the ini-
tiation of the settlement conference that his client refuses to pay any
33. Id.
34. See Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 107 F.R.D. 275, 277-83.
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 16:
(a) Pretrial Conferences; Objectives. In any action, the court may in its discretion direct
the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear before it for a confer-
ence or conferences before trial for such purposes as
(5) facilitating the settlement of the case.
(c) Subjects to be Discussed at Pretrial Conferences. The participants at any conference
under this rule may consider and take action with respect to
(7) the possibility of settlement or the use of extra judicial procedures to resolve the
dispute;
(f) Sanctions. If a party or party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order,
or if no appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling or pretrial conference, or
if a party or party's attorney is substantially unprepared to participate in the conference, or
if a party or party's attorney fails to participate in good faith, the judge, upon motion or
the judge's own initiative, may make such orders with regard thereto as are just .... In
lieu of or in addition to any other sanction, the judge shall require the party or the attorney
representing the party or both to pay the reasonable expenses incurred because of any
noncompliance with this rule, including attorney's fees ....
36. 107 F.R.D. 275, 277.
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amount to settle, wanting instead its day in court, is inconsistent with the
tenor and policy of Rule 16.37
The Seventh Circuit's panel decision, however, did not terminate the
litigation spawned by the magistrate's order. Instead, the appeals court
sitting en banc reversed the panel's ruling in a 6-5 decision. Citing to a
district court's inherent powers to control cases and manage its own af-
fairs, the en banc majority held that the magistrate possessed the author-
ity to order a represented party to appear at a settlement conference in
order to promote the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination"3 8 of
the action. According to the court, Rule 16 does not alter this authority
because it provides direction to the district court only with respect to
trial advocates, attorneys of record, and pro se litigants, not represented
parties."
IV. THE DISTRICT COURTS' INHERENT POWERS
In addition to those powers granted by the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, the district courts possess certain inherent powers.40 These pow-
ers, as traditionally recognized by the Supreme Court and other appel-
late courts, 41 enable the district courts to "manage their own affairs so as
to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases. ' 42 The en
banc majority in Heileman predicated its approval of the magistrate's
action upon these inherent powers. According to the majority, the magis-
trate's actions merely represented another application of the district
courts' "inherent authority to preserve the efficiency and more impor-
taptly the integrity of the judicial process." '43
As recognized by the majority, these inherent powers are not without
limitations.44 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83, a district
court may not exercise its inherent powers in any manner which is incon-
37. 848 F.2d 1415, 1418-22.
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 provides: "These rules govern the procedure in the United States
district courts in all suits . . . .They shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action."
39. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 648-57 (7th Cir. 1989).
40. Rayner, supra note 16, at 179 (citing United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, I1
U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)).
41. See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962). In Link, the Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide a definitive index of
the district courts' powers and were not intended to be the exclusive authority for the
district courts' actions. See also Brockton Say. Bank v. Pete, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.,
771 F.2d 5, 11 (Ist Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1018 (1986).
42. 871 F.2d 648, 651 (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)).




sistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.4 5 As noted by Judge
Coffey in his dissent, the Supreme Court recently stressed this restriction
on the district courts' use of their inherent powers.41 In Bank of Nova
Scotia v. United States,47 the Supreme Court ruled that a district court
may not employ its inherent powers (labeled supervisory powers by the
Supreme Court) in a manner that contravenes the balance struck by fed-
eral rules of procedure between the varying societal interests.48 While
this case dealt with a district court's use of inherent powers in the crimi-
nal setting (the judge's use of inherent powers to dismiss an indictment
based upon "harmless error" in a grand jury proceeding), 49 the Supreme
Court's ruling seems equally applicable in the civil setting in light of the
dictates of Rule 83. This requirement of consistency would appear to
limit the magistrate's power to direct the settlement process by requiring
his actions to conform to Rule 16, which addresses the judge's role in
settlement. Like the procedural rule in question in Bank of Nova Scotia,
Rule 16 reflects an endeavor to balance different societal interests -
judicial efficiency and the rights of individual litigants.50 The appellate
courts should not allow the district courts to circumvent this carefully
achieved balance through the application of their inherent powers.
The en banc majority concluded that the magistrate's actions accorded
with the dictates of Rule 16. Noting that Rule 16 refers only to the
participation of trial advocates, attorneys of record, and pro se litigants
in pretrial proceedings, the court nevertheless stated that the omission of
represented parties from the language of Rule 16 did not give rise to the
negative implication that no represented party may be directed to ap-
pear. The court further ruled that the magistrate's actions conformed
with and aided in accomplishing the purpose and intent of Rule 16 when
construed liberally under Rule 1 to secure the just and expedient deter-
mination of every action.51 Under this analysis, the magistrate's use of
the court's inherent powers to order represented parties to attend pretrial
45. FED. R. Civ. P. 83 provides: "In all cases not provided for by rule, the district judges
and magistrates may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules
or those of the district in which they act."
46. 871 F.2d 648, 659 (Coffey, J., dissenting) (quoting Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140,
148 (1985)).
47. 108 S. Ct. 2369 (1988).
48. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2369, 2374 (1988).
49. Id. at 2372-73.
50. See Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 886 (7th Cir. 1987) (quoting S.
REP. No. 1744, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. ADMIN. NEWS
3023, 3026). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 16, "are the product of
a careful process of study and reflection designed to take 'due cognizance of both the need
for expedition of cases and the protection of individual rights.'"
51. 871 F.2d 648, 652.
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conferences would not contradict the provisions of Rule 16. The major-
ity's reasoning, however, contains many defects.
V. THE LIMITS OF FEDERAL RULE 16
A. Federal Rule 16(c): Exploration of the Possibility of Settlement
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 bestows upon a court the general
authority to establish pretrial procedures. Under Rule 16, a court can
require litigants to participate in a pretrial conference to consider the
orderly administration of the suit, and, as amended in 1983, to explore
the possibility of settlement.52 As the Heileman panel decision notes,
Rule 16(c) does no more than recognize the possibility of settlement as
an appropriate subject of discussion at pretrial conferences. 3 The Rule
provides that the participants in pretrial conferences may consider the
possibility of settlement. Rule 16(c), however, gives no directive as to
who these participants may or must be. The magistrate in Heileman re-
lied upon Rule 16 as a warrant for his actions. Yet, Rule 16(c) does not
explicitly confer upon a judge the power to require that a party represen-
tative bearing full settlement authority attend the pretrial conference."'
In fact, subpart (c) of Rule 16 fails to provide any guidance as to whom
the court may require to appear at the conference.
B. Federal Rule 16(a): Delineation of the Judge's Control
Although Rule 16(c) provides no definition of "participant," Rule
16(a) does delineate the bounds of a district court's discretion in deter-
mining whom to order to appear at a pretrial meeting. As amended,
Rule 16(a) provides that "the court may in its discretion direct the attor-
neys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear before it for
a conference or conferences before trial . . . ."I Rule 16(a) thereby only
grants the district courts power to require trial advocates - attorneys of
record and pro se litigants - to attend the pretrial conference. Under
the Rule's language, the court's authority does not extend to ordering the
members of a represented party to attend such conferences. Assuming
the subsections of Rule 16 are consistent with each other, the definition
of "participants" in Rule 16(c) encompasses only the "forced" attend-
52. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7).
53. 848 F.2d 1415, 1421.
54. Id. at 1420-21
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a).
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ance of an attorney of a represented party or the member(s) of an unrep-
resented party.5" In light of this wording, therefore, Rule 16 does not
appear to authorize the magistrate's actions. In fact, the specificity of the
language appears to limit the magistrate's powers in pretrial conferences
to ordering the attendance of only attorneys of record and unrepresented
parties. Had the drafters of the rules intended or desired to extend the
court's reach under Rule 16(c) to represented parties, they would have
expressly provided so. 57 In view of the above analysis, the magistrate in
Heileman apparently overstepped the limits of his discretion in ordering
the attendance of both counsel and a party representative with full set-
tlement authority.
The en banc majority, as previously noted, did not perceive the Rule's
language as creating words of limitation. According to the majority, the
omission of represented parties from the Rule's coverage does not give
rise to the negative implication that no represented party may be di-
rected to appear.5 8 The majority, however, seemingly reaches this conclu-
sion in a vacuum as it gives no consideration to the remainder of the
Rule's language or to the history of the Rule. As noted by the majority
in the panel decision59 and by Judge Manion in his dissent to the en banc
opinion, 60 Rule 16 repeatedly distinguishes between represented and un-
represented parties. This distinction is consistent with a litigant's statu-
tory right to representation by an attorney, as well as with the attorney's
traditional role in litigation." This distinction as echoed throughout Rule
16, and, as noted below, particularly in its sanctions provision, suggests
the opposite conclusion of that reached by the en banc majority. If the
Rule's drafters did not intend to limit the district courts' powers to or-
dering only attorneys of record and pro se litigants to attend pretrial
conferences, they surely would not have taken such pains to maintain a
rigid distinction between represented parties and unrepresented parties.
The conclusion reached by the en banc majority also ignores the his-
tory of the Rule. Prior to 1983, Rule 16 applied only to attorneys of
record. Rule 16, as originally drafted, only provided district court judges
with the authority to require attorneys for.represented parties to attend
pretrial conferences.6 2 After careful consideration, the Supreme Court
and Congress amended the Rule in 1983 to achieve increased judicial
efficiency. Yet, the Court and Congress only extended the district courts'
56. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
57. 84& F.2d 1415, 1421.
58. 871 F.2d 648, 652.
59. 848 F.2d. 1415, 1420-21.
60. 871 F.2d 648, 666-67 (Manion, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 667 (Manion, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 659 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
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powers to the extent of granting them the authority to compel unrepre-
sented parties to attend pretrial conferences and of officially recognizing
settlement as a legitimate topic of discussion at such conferences.6 3 The
amendment stopped short of bestowing upon these courts the "broad and
sweeping" authority to require represented parties to attend pretrial con-
ferences." The clear import of this omission is a conscious decision to
limit the courts' powers to compelling only trial advocates - attorneys
of record and pro se litigants - to attend pretrial conferences. If the
drafters intended to allow the district courts to compel the attendance of
represented parties at pretrial conferences, they certainly would have
made such an intention clear when amending the Rule, rather than leav-
ing such interpretation to the courts. The majority offers no explanation
of why the drafters employed the language that they did, rather than
explicitly granting the courts the power to compel represented parties to
attend.65
The advisory committee's notes evidence no intention to grant the dis-
trict courts the power to compel represented parties to attend pretrial
conferences. It seems likely that if the drafters intended to confer such
broad authority on the judge, there would be some indication of it in
their notes. One, therefore, can ascribe this omission either to an error,
oversight on the part of the drafters, or to an intentional limitation of the
court's power.6 The immensity of such an oversight makes it difficult to
attribute the omission to sloppy draftsmanship. An error of such magni-
tude would be extremely difficult to overlook. The drafters' failure to
provide the courts with the power to order represented parties to the
settlement table, therefore, appears to represent a conscious choice on
the part of the drafters.
C. Federal Rule 16(j): The Court's Sanctioning Power
Neither Rule 16(a) nor Rule 16(c) grants the district court the power
to level sanctions for failing to comply with its pretrial orders. The au-
thority to sanction uncooperative parties lies in Rule 16(f). Rule 16(f)
provides:
If a party or party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order, or
if no appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling or pretrial
conference, or if a party or party's attorney is substantially unprepared to
participate in the conference, or if a party or party's attorney fails to par-
63. Id. at 660 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
64. Id.




ticipate in good faith, the judge, upon motion or his own initiative, may
make such orders with regard thereto as are just .... 67
Rule 16(f) further mandates that the judge order the party or the party's
attorney or both to pay any reasonable expenses, including attorneys'
fees incurred by other parties to the action as a result of their noncom-
pliance with pretrial orders, either in lieu of or in addition to any other
sanction. Although, as addressed by the majority in the Heileman panel
decision,18 the district court for the Eastern District of Kentucky inter-
preted Rule 16(f) in Lockhart v. Patel to allow the district court to
order represented parties to attend settlement conferences, this interpre-
tation appears faulty.
The Lockhart court's reading of Rule 16(f) seems plausible, even cor-
rect, when Rule 16(f) is read in isolation, but not when Rule 16 is read
as a whole. Rule 16(f) represents only a single division of the whole Rule
- the portion conferring upon the court the formal authority to sanction
persons for not following its pretrial directives issued pursuant to the
earlier subsections. Section 16(f) does not expand the court's authority
under section 16(a) or section 16(c). If, by adding section 16(f), the
drafters meant to provide the court with the additional authority to order
a represented party to attend settlement conferences, they would have
amended section 16(a) to apply to attorneys, unrepresented parties, and
represented parties. In fact, as the panel decision in Heileman argues,
section 16(f) empowers the court to level sanctions when "no appearance
is made on behalf of a party,"7 0 not if a party fails to appear. Under the
plain meaning of this language, the court could sanction a party only if
that party sent no representative. It could not sanction the party which
sent its attorney on its behalf.
The language of section 16(f), when read in conjunction with the other
sections of the Rule, authorizes sanctions in two situations. First, a dis-
trict court may sanction an unrepresented party or the attorney for a
represented party who does not appear at a settlement conference. Sec-
ond, the court may in appropriate situations sanction a represented party
whose attorney fails to appear despite the client's directive, as the client
is bound by his lawyer's actions.7 1 As the Supreme Court of the United
States remarked in Link v. Wabash R.R.,72 a client voluntarily selects
his attorney as his representative in an action, and, therefore, "cannot
67. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f).
68. 848 F.2d 1415, 1420.
69. 115 F.R.D. 44, 46 (E.D. Ky. 1987).
70. 848 F.2d 1415, 1420.
71. Id. at 1420-21 (citing Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962)).
72. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
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. . . avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of [his] freely se-
lected [counsel] . '7 3 Furthermore, as the panel majority argues:
If a represented party does choose to appear and participate at a pretrial
conference, Rule 16(f) demands that the party be a help and not a hin-
drance; he must be prepared to participate and participate in good faith.
But nothing in Rule 16(f) specifically authorizes a district court to order a
represented party to appear at a settlement conference.7 1
The dissent to the panel decision contended that the authority to con-
vene a settlement conference is an empty power if it does not allow the
court to require the presence of the parties themselves.7 5 According to
this dissent, the policy behind Rule 16 presupposes the authority of the
court to require represented parties to attend a settlement conference.78
Yet, as noted above, if the drafters believed such power to be essential to
the fulfillment of the purpose(s) behind Rule 16, one would assume that
the drafters would have incorporated such language into the Rule. Like
the en banc majority, the panel's dissent presents no reason why the
drafters would omit such important words.
Confining the district court's powers to compelling only attorneys of
record and pro se litigants does not, as the dissent to the panel decision
contends, nullify the impact of Rule 16. The district court clearly pos-
sesses the power under Rule 16 to order the attorney of a represented
party or an unrepresented party to appear at a pretrial conference to
discuss, among other subjects, the possibility of settlement. In addition,
the court possesses the power to sanction the unrepresented party and
both the attorney of a represented party and the party itself for failure to
obey such pretrial orders. Even without the presence of the represented
party, the conference enables the judge to get a feel for the issues in the
case, and enables the parties to state their positions and explore the pos-
sibilities of settlement. The attorney of the represented party serves as an
agent of that party. As such, one must assume that he will operate in the
best interests of the client and according to the desires of the client. The
attorney will convey any settlement offer made by the opposing party to
his client, and he will likely explore the advantages and disadvantages of
accepting the offer. The lawyer will fully apprise his client of the sub-
stance of the proceedings, discussing at some length the tenor of the pro-
ceedings and his perceptions of the strength of the client's position. 77 He
will urge the client to accept a settlement offer if he feels his client has a
73. Id. at 633-34.
74. 848 F.2d 1415, 1421.
75. Id. at 1426 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
76. Id.
77. 871 F.2d 648, 667 (Manion, J., dissenting).
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poor chance of faring better at trial. The ultimate decision, however, re-
mains with the client, who possesses the same or "similar" knowledge as
those in attendance at the settlement conference, albeit secondhand.78
The dissent to the panel decision labels the authority to convene a set-
tlement conference under Rule 16 a "hollow authority" in the absence of
the power to compel the presence of the parties themselves.79 The dissent
states that settlement conferences are often unproductive unless all of the
necessary parties are present and have full authority to settle the case.80
This argument presumes that secondhand knowledge lends itself less to-
ward encouraging settlement than does the firsthand information gleaned
from attendance at the conference. The judge cites no empirical evidence
to support this supposition. Recent studies of small claims mediation and
adjudication in Maine and Ontario support the argument of the panel's
dissent, showing consistently and strikingly higher rates of voluntary
compliance with resolutions reached through mediation.81 Others analyz-
ing these statistics attribute the higher rate of compliance in mediation
to the nature of the dispute and the type of forum. 2
An analysis of the Heileman situation leads one to believe that com-
pelling an unwilling litigant to attend a settlement conference is less
likely to result in settlement than is a settlement conference attended by
only attorneys of record and unrepresented parties. First, an unwilling
litigant forced to attend the settlement conference at considerable time
and expense will be less amenable to compromise than before being
forced to attend. The prospective litigant will see the conference as an
unwarranted imposition on his valuable time, rendering him more hostile
to settlement. The effectiveness of the settlement conference will likely
be hindered by the forced presence of a represented party, who spends
the entire conference thinking his time could be more valuably spent
elsewhere.
The party's objectivity will be clouded by the adverse emotions arising
from past dealings with the other party. Two attorneys- removed from the
passions of the situation can more objectively discuss the situation. After
attending the conference, the attorney can present his view or estimate of
the situation to the client. The client will be more agreeable to the sug-
gestion of settlement when removed from the direct exposure to his oppo-
78. 848 F.2d 1415, 1419-20.
79. Id. at 1423 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
80. Id.
81. N. ROGERS & C. McEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW. POLICY. PRACTICE 22 n.41 (1989)
(citing McEwen & Maimen, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving Compliance
Through Consent, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 11, 45-47 (1984)).
82. Id. at 22-23 n.41 (citing Roehl & Cook, Issues in Mediation: Rhetoric and Reality
Revisited, 41 J. Soc. IssuEs 161, 163-64 (1985)).
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nent and the emotions induced by such exposure. He will weigh the situ-
ation more rationally, accepting a settlement offer which he might have
refused if confronted directly with the offer by the party in opposition.
VI. SPEED AND EFFICIENCY VS. JUSTICE
While the above suppositions rest upon observations of human nature,
the case law also invalidates the position of the en banc majority. The
Supreme Court initially adopted a deferential attitude toward the district
court's authority to use pretrial procedures to orderly and expeditiously
dispose of a case. In Link v. Wabash R.R.,83 the Court affirmed the
lower court's sua sponte dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint with
prejudice due to the failure of the plaintiff's counsel to appear at a pre-
trial conference as ordered by the lower court pursuant to local rule. The
attorney informed the judge on the morning of the conference that he
would be unable to attend it due to his workload. When the attorney
failed to show for the conference, the judge exercised his "inherent pow-
ers," dismissing the suit for failure to prosecute."' The Court affirmed
the district court's authority under its inherent powers to dismiss a case
sua sponte for failure to prosecute, emphasizing the court's broad discre-
tion in ordering such dismissals.8 5
Numerous appellate decisions, left untouched by the Supreme Court,
qualify its initial deference. The district court's actions in Link fall
squarely within the authority subsequently extended to the district courts
by Rule 16. Yet, Justice Black cautioned in Link against seeking to re-
duce the congestion present in court dockets in any way which "under-
cuts the very purposes for which courts are created - that is, to try
cases on their merits and render judgments in accordance with the sub-
stantial rights of the parties." '86
The Fourth Circuit heeded Justice Black's warning in McCargo v.
Hedrick,8" abandoning this traditionally deferential approach to strike
down in its entirety a pretrial rule of the Northern District of West Vir-
ginia. The rule seemed innocent on its surface, requiring only that oppos-
ing counsel "confer and . . . meaningfully and effectively express and
commit themselves in a written statement on matters and issues involved
in and controlling determination of the action."88 The court ruled that
83. 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
84. Id. at 629.
85. Peckham, supra note 14, at 791.
86. 370 U.S. 626, 648.
87. 545 F.2d 393 (4th Cir. 1976).
88. McCargo v. Hedrick, 545 F.2d 393, 394 (4th Cir. 1976).
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the numerous, greatly detailed "implementation" provisions, adminis-
tered by a magistrate who ordered even more specific amendments to
plaintiff's proposed pretrial order, rendered plaintiff's compliance with
the rule vir.ually impossible.8" The magistrate dismissed the case sua
sponte with prejudice when the plaintiffs failed to file a third amended
pretrial order. Plaintiffs' failure to file, however, resulted from defend-
ant's refusal to produce the requested lists of documentary evidence.90
Stating that "local rules are not a source of power but are instead a
manifestation of it,""1 the Fourth Circuit held that the local rule was
void as inconsistent with Rule 16.9 While willing to grant the district
court the discretion to develop pretrial procedures, the Fourth Circuit
would not permit the unfettered use of such discretion in a manner that
effectively restricts the accessibility of the courts to those with meritori-
ous claims.
In a similar vein, the Seventh Circuit ruled in Identiseal Corp. of Wis-
consin v. Positive Identification Systems, Inc.9" that Rule 16 by its terms
does not confer upon a district court the authority to compel litigants to
obtain admissions of fact and of documents even if it is clear that such
admissions would simplify the trial. In its analysis, the court expressly
stated that the court's discretion under Rule 16 is limited.94 The rule
only requires the attorneys for the parties, or a member of an unrepre-
sented party, to attend the conference for the purpose of considering the
possibility of admissions. The Seventh Circuit refused to uphold the
sanctions and dismissal of the suit, proclaiming that it would uphold the
lower court's actions only if the plaintiff's failure to file a final pretrial
report constituted a failure to prosecute.9 5
Likewise, in J.F. Edwards Construction Co. v. Anderson Safeway
Guard Rail Corp., 6 the Seventh Circuit previously recognized that while
Rule 16 bestows broad discretion on the district courts, the discretion is
by no means unlimited. The Edwards court ruled that Rule 16 does not
authorize a district court to compel a stipulation of the facts and to level
sanctions against the party when no stipulation is forthcoming.9 7 The
Seventh Circuit again established the. failure to prosecute as the key un-
89. Id. at 396-401.
90. Id. at 395.
91. Id. at 402.
92. Id.
93. 560 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1977).
94. Identiseal Corp. of Wisconsin v. Positive Identification Systems, Inc., 560 F.2d 298,
302 (7th Cir. 1977).
95. Id.
96. 542 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1976).
97. J.F. Edwards Constr. Co. v. Anderson Safeway Guard Rail Corp., 542 F.2d 1313,
1325 (7th Cir. 1976).
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locking the door to the judge's power to compel obedience to his requests
and demands relating to pretrial conferences.
Under the Seventh Circuit's criteria in Identiseal and Edwards, Jo-
seph Oat's action would not open the door to judicial sanction. Joseph
Oat did send a representative to both conferences, albeit in the form of
its trial and corporate counsel rather than a party member with full set-
tlement authority. The fact that Joseph Oat manifested an unwillingness
to pay any amount of money to achieve settlement does not constitute a
failure to prosecute. If anything, this unwillingness to pay any monetary
amount to effect settlement serves as a sign of Joseph Oat's readiness to
proceed with the litigation. Furthermore, Joseph Oat's previous actions
cannot be characterized as dilatory to the point of manifesting a failure
to prosecute. Joseph Oat settled its differences with Heileman and dis-
missed its claim against RME. The fact that RME refused to drop its
claims against Joseph Oat and that Joseph Oat indicated that it was not
prepared to yield such claims cannot be considered a failure to prosecute
under any circumstances.
The Seventh Circuit most recently stressed the limits of the district
court's power under Rule 16 in Strandell v. Jackson County. 8 The par-
ents of Michael Strandell brought a civil rights action against Jackson
County, Illinois in reaction to the arrest, strip search, imprisonment, and
suicidal death of their son. In anticipation of a pretrial conference, the
plaintiffs filed a written report concerning settlement prospects, reporting
that they were requesting $500,000 and the defendants had refused to
discuss the issue." At the pretrial conference, the district court sug-
gested that the parties consent to a summary jury trial.100 The plaintiffs
refused to participate in a summary jury trial, filing a motion to advance
the case for trial. The district judge subsequently set the case for trial.
Prior to the scheduled date, the district court again discussed settlement
prospects with counsel, expressing its view that a trial could not be ac-
commodated due to its crowded dockets.101 The judge again requested
that the parties submit to a summary jury trial. Plaintiffs again refused
to participate in such proceeding, announcing their desire to proceed to
98. 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987).
99. Id. at 884.
100. A summary jury trial generally lasts one day, and consists of the selection of six
jurors to hear approximations by counsel of the expected evidence. After receiving an ab-
breviated charge, the jury retires with directions to render a consensus verdict. After a
verdict is reached, the jury is informed that its verdict is advisory in nature and nonbind-
ing. The objective of this procedure is to induce the parties to negotiate a settlement. See
Lambros, Report to The Judicial Conference of the United States, reprinted at 103 F.R.D.
461 (1984).
101. 838 F.2d 884, 884-85.
[Vol. 5:1 1989]
JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT
trial immediately. Counsel for plaintiffs justified the decision, stating
that the summary jury trial would require disclosure of privileged state-
ments to which the judge had earlier denied defendants access during
discovery. The district court rejected this argument, ordering the parties
to participate in a summary jury trial. 102 Refusing to proceed with the
summary jury trial, plaintiff's counsel was held in criminal contempt.
Counsel thereafter filed a notice of appeal.1
03
Acknowledging the district court's power to control and manage its
docket, the Seventh Circuit cautioned that such power must be exercised
in harmony with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as such rules re-
flect a careful process of study designed to balance the need for expedi-
tion of cases and the protection of individual rights. Innovation by the
individual judicial officer must conform to the balance between the needs
for judicial efficiency and the rights of the individual litigant as promul-
gated by the Supreme Court and Congress.10 4 The Seventh Circuit over-
ruled the district judge's order, holding that the federal district court
may not require litigants to participate in a nonbinding summary jury
trial. In so doing, the Strandell court emphasized the limits of judicial
power under Rule 16:
In our view, while the pretrial conference of Rule 16 was intended to foster
settlement through the use of extrajudicial procedures, it was not intended
to require that an unwilling litigant be sidetracked from the normal course
of litigation. The drafters of Rule 16 certainly intended to provide, in the
pretrial conference, "a neutral forum" for discussing the matter of settle-
ment. However, it is also clear that they did not foresee that the conference
would be used "to impose settlement negotiations on unwilling litigants...
" While the drafters intended that the trial judge "explor[e] the use of
procedures other than litigation to resolve the dispute," - including "urging
the litigants to employ adjudicatory techniques outside the courthouse," -
they clearly did not intend to require the parties to take part in such
activities.10 5
The Seventh Circuit, thus, clearly expressed a theme running throughout
its earlier cases concerning the limits of judicial power under Rule 16:
speed and judicial efficiency should not be sought at the expense of jus-
tice or due process.
The dissent to the panel decision in Heileman contends that the ma-
jority improperly relies upon Strandell to support its position. According
to Judge Flaum, the holding in Strandell is very narrow, overruling the
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 886-87.
105. Id. at 887 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note) (emphasis
omitted).
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
district judge's actions because Rule 16 does not expressly provide for
summary jury trials. 10 Yet, the broad language used by the Strandell
court does not limit itself to this reading. The Seventh Circuit clearly
stated that while it recognized the need for the district judge to control
his docket, "a crowded docket does not permit the court to avoid the
adjudication of cases properly within its congressionally-mandated juris-
diction."10 7 The Seventh Circuit thus recognized a problem explored by
many advocates and nonadvocates of alternative dispute resolution:
"speed and superficial lack of expense are, in and of themselves, incom-
plete answers."' 08
VII. INTENT TO ENCOURAGE OR COERCE SETTLEMENT?
In Kothe v. Smith,'0 9 the Second Circuit ruled that the failure of a
physician to offer to settle a malpractice claim for $20,000, despite the
district court's urging, did not warrant the imposition of sanctions
against the physician even though he settled for such an amount after
one day of trial. Although the Second Circuit gave much weight in its
analysis to the fact that the patient never demanded less than $50,000 or
indicated any inclination to settle for any amount in the area of $20,000,
its pronouncement that Rule 16(c)(7) was designed to encourage pretrial
settlement discussions and not to impose settlement negotiations on un-
willing parties indicates the court's reasons for overturning the district
court's actions." 0 The drafters noted in the advisory committee notes to
the 1983 amendments that the purpose of Rule 16(c)(7) is not to "im-
pose settlement negotiations on unwilling litigants,""' 1 but to provide a
neutral forum for discussing the subject. Under the Second Cirquit anal-
ysis, the judge possesses the power to foster settlement negotiations and
to encourage them in any manner possible so long as the judge's actions
do not amount to an imposition of settlement negotiations on unwilling
litigants. Under this analysis, the magistrate's actions in Heileman would
certainly be outside the limits of his discretion. Although it might be
argued that forced attendance does not constitute forced negotiations,
one would consider it inconceivable that to order an unwilling litigant to
106. 848 F.2d 1415, 1425 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
107. 838 F.2d 884, 888 (citing Thermtron Products v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336,
344 (1976)).
108. Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
494, 546 (1986). See also Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses
of the Mandatory Settlement conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485 (1985).
109. 771 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1985).
110. Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985).
111. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note.
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expend the time and to incur the expense of flying from Pennsylvania to
Wisconsin to attend a pretrial settlement conference does not amount to
the imposition of settlement. Judge Posner in his dissent labeled the
magistrate's continued insistence on Joseph Oat's sending an executive to
Wisconsin "arbitrary, unreasonable, willful, and indeed petulant." 112
This characterization is especially true in light of the magistrate's knowl-
edge that Joseph Oat could not negotiate a settlement even if it wished
to because of its insurer's refusal to pay any amount in settlement.
Perceiving the likelihood of judicial abuse, the drafters warned against
the use of judicial power under Rule 16 to coerce settlement. The en
banc majority argues that requiring a represented party to attend a set-
tlement conference does not amount to coercing settlement. According to
the majority, while a magistrate cannot force litigants to settle their dis-
putes, he can require an unwilling represented party to participate in
settlement negotiations in good faith.1 The majority's arguments, how-
ever, fail to take notice of the economics of the situation. First, the
poorer of the parties may be less able to collect and analyze the informa-
tion essential to predict the outcome of the litigation, and thus be disad-
vantaged in the settlement process. Second, the party may need the dam-
ages sought immediately and thus be induced to settle in order to
accelerate payment, even though realizing that he might receive more if
he waits for a judgment. Third, the poorer party might be forced to set-
tle because he lacks the money to finance the litigation, to cover either
his own expenses or those imposed by his opponent through the misuse of
procedural mechanisms such as discovery."1 4 While Joseph Oat is likely
to be neither so unsophisticated nor so poor as to resemble a sitting duck
during the settlement conference, exigent financial circumstances are in
existence which make the magistrate's order and subsequent sanctions
coercive in nature. First, Joseph Oat is at a financial disadvantage which
could work against it in the settlement process in that the corporation's
liability insurer flatly refuses to pay any sum of money to settle the case.
Joseph Oat, thus, enters any settlement conference uncertain of its finan-
cial position and of the likelihood of indemnification from its insurer.
Joseph Oat, therefore, might be tempted to settle for an amount which
its available resources could cover, fearing an adverse judgment of a
more exorbitant amount which its insurer might not be forced to cover.
Second, attendance at the settlement conference by a party representa-
tive possessing full settlement authority gives rise to costs which might
pose an undue burden on the party. Joseph Oat would certainly incur
112. 871 F.2d 648, 658 (Posner, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 653-54.
114. Fiss, supra note 15, at 1076.
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monetary costs in flying its representative to and from Wisconsin for a
settlement conference in which, due to its liability insurer's proclama-
tion, it was financially constrained from participating. Furthermore, only
those executives positioned at the upper rungs of the corporate ladder
would possess the mandated settlement authority. Their time is both val-
uable and limited. Requiring those executives to attend the settlement
conferences places an extra burden on the party, which makes settlement
increasingly attractive.
Requiring a represented party to attend a settlement conference is co-
ercive in other manners as well. Pretrial conferences are less visible and
usually unreviewable, bestowing more authority upon trial courts while
at the same time providing litigants with fewer procedural safeguards to
protect them from abuse of that authority. 15 "Judges are very powerful
people; they decide contested issues, and they alone can compel obedi-
ence by the threat of contempt."1 6 As a result, those subject to judges'
authority challenge it at considerable risk.
Very few institutional constraints bind the judge or magistrate during
the pretrial phase of litigation. According to Judith Resnik, the judge
possesses considerable power in the pretrial stages of litigation. During
pretrial supervision, judges make decisions informally, in chambers and
without the presence of a court reporter, and often meet with parties ex
parte.11 7 Appellate review is virtually unheard of during this phase of
litigation. Moreover, these judicial acts rarely encounter public scrutiny.
As a result, parties are often better off to capitulate to judicial pressure
tp settle rather than risk the hostility of a judge who, under the individ-
ual calendar system, possesses ongoing responsibility for the case.'
By making the judge both adjudicator and manager, one substantially
expands the opportunities for judges to use - or abuse - iheir pow-
ers.11" An attorney familiar with the power and politics of the courtroom
can more effectively resist the judge and reason with him than the client,
who, unaccustomed to the games of the courtroom, will likely either irri-
tate the judge through a perceived lack of deference or capitulate in awe
of the judge's power. The client is also less likely to be aware of when
the judge has stepped outside the bounds of his authority. While the
presence of the party's attorney partially alleviates these problems, it
cannot completely dispel them as the party still faces the overwhelming
power of the court in an unknown situation. The magistrate's attitude
115. Resnik, supra note I, at 424-26.
116. Id. at 425.
117. Id. at 413.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 425.
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towards Joseph Oat, as indicated by his refusal to give credence to the
corporation's constraints, clearly calls into question his impartiality. Jo-
seph Oat would certainly take into consideration the court's previously
uncompromising attitude when deciding whether to settle.
VIII. JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY: A BY-PRODUCT OF THE MANDATORY
SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE?
While the opponents of managerial judging concentrate upon per-
ceived flaws in the fairness of the practice, focusing on its possible coer-
civeness, its proponents stress the increase in judicial efficiency wrought
by the technique. Advocates of managerial judging assume that case
management enhances efficiency in three ways: decreased delay, in-
creased dispositions, and reduced litigation costs. 120 Yet, little empirical
evidence supports the claim that judicial management "works" either to
settle cases or to provide cheaper, quicker, or fairer dispositions.
Maurice Rosenberg completed the first systematic study of pretrial
conferences, focusing on mandatory conference, voluntary conference,
and nonconference cases in New Jersey. 2 That study reported findings,
as of yet uncontroverted, that the mandatory pretrial conferences actu-
ally impaired the efficiency of the court by consuming judges' time in
handling conferences, rather than trying cases. The judge's time consti-
tutes the most expensive courthouse resource. 22 "Rather than concen-
trate all their energy deciding motions, charging juries, and drafting
opinions, managerial judges must meet with parties, develop litigation
plans, and compel obedience to their new management rules. 1 23 A study
by the Federal Judicial Center supports Rosenberg's findings, revealing
that courts with the greatest settlement activity experience the slowest
rate of case terminations, or conversely, the "faster" courts were those
that minimized judicial involvement in settlement. 4 Further, Rosen-
berg's study shows that cases submitted to mandatory pretrial confer-
ences possessed no greater likelihood of resulting in settlements than
those not so submitted. Settlement rates remained fairly consistent
120. See S. FLANDERS, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN THE U.S. DIs-
TRICT COURTS (1977); Brazil, Improving Judicial Controls over the pretrial Development
of Civil Actions: Model Rules for Case Management and Sanctions, 1981 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 873 (1981) (discussing management of pretrial discovery).
121. See M. ROSENBERG, THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND EFFECTIVE JUSTICE (1964).
122. Resnik, supra note 1, at 423 (citing J. KAKALIK & A. ROBYN. COSTS OF THE CIVIL
JUSTICE SYSTEM: COURT EXPENDITURES FOR PROCESSING TORT CASES 64 (1982) (annual
costs of each federal judge estimated to be $752,000)).
123. Resnik, supra note 1, at 423-24.
124. See S. FLANDERS. DISTRICT COURT STUDIES PROJECT INTERIM REPORT (1976).
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across all three types of cases studied.' 25 By implication, therefore, judi-
cial settlement management may indeed be an inefficient use of judicial
time as management may require judges to supervise lawsuits that would
have ended of their own accord, lawsuits that otherwise would fail to
consume any judicial resources.' 21
The Heileman case clearly represents an inefficient use of court re-
sources under the guise of managerial judging. Despite knowledge of Jo-
seph Oat's inability to settle the case, the magistrate ordered a number
of settlement conferences. Moreover, when Joseph Oat failed to send a
party member with full settlement authority, he conducted the confer-
ences anyway, refusing to allow Joseph Oat's attorney to participate in
the discussions. As a definite settlement could not be reached without the
agreement of Joseph Oat, further conferences were necessary. The judge,
therefore, wasted not only the court's time, but also that of the parties.
Yet, even with full awareness of Joseph Oat's circumstances, the magis-
trate scheduled another conference, ordering Joseph Oat to send a mem-
ber with full settlement authority. When Joseph Oat again failed to send
such a person, the magistrate resorted to contempt proceedings to coerce
Joseph Oat's attendance. A series of trials contesting the legitimacy of
the contempt holding then ensued. While Joseph Oat ultimately settled
its claims with Heileman in December of 1985, the litigation spawned by
the magistrate's order continued into 1988 when the Seventh Circuit ren-
dered its en banc decision. The magistrate would have saved numerous
court resources had he originally given consideration to Joseph Oat's pre-
dicament and proceeded with the trial.
IX. CONCLUSION
Managerial judging can improve the quality of trial proceedings,' 27
but even its proponents recognize that it must be used judiciously.'2
Employed in the right case in the correct manner, managerial judging
can result in a quick, efficient, and just result. Judges must, however,
remain alert to the limits of their power in the settlement process. "A
judge should, of course, be wary of appearing to coerce settlement, either
by using overly burdensome pretrial procedures as a bludgeon or by be-
125. M. ROSENBERG, supra note 122, at 45-50.
126. Resnik, supra note 1, at 424; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 109, at 494.
127. M. ROSENBERG, supra note 122, at 45-50.




coming overly involved in the settlement process. '129 Quantity should not
be won at the expense of quality.
Given the above guidelines, the magistrate in Heileman clearly abused
his power. Due to financial constraints, Joseph Oat could not settle at
any price. Despite full knowledge of Joseph Oat's predicament, the mag-
istrate attempted to force the party to participate in the settlement con-
ference at great expense in terms of both time and money, resorting to
contempt proceedings when all else failed. The same danger exists when-
ever a judge takes it upon himself to order not only the lawyer of a
represented party but also a party member with full settlement authority
to attend settlement discussions. These parties must pay not only their
attorney fees, but also expend their own time and money to attend the
conference. The drafters of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 recog-
nized this potential for coercion. 130 With this in mind, they drafted the
Rule so as to limit the judge's power to ordering an unrepresented party
or the attorney of a represented party to attend the settlement confer-
ence. In some circumstances, changes in incentives as a result of mana-
gerial judging may proinote just outcomes. These changes, however,
should not be wrought at the expense of procedural justice. Are settle-
ments achieved under conditions of imbalance, indeterminacy, and judi-
cial coercion any better than adjudication reached under similarly dis-
turbing circumstances?
Susan Kaye Antalovich
129. Peckham, supra note 14, at 788.
130. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note.

